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REALITIES  BEHIND  PROPOSED  REFORMS
Deborah  Anker
The  Clinton  Administration  recently  announced  proposals  for regulato-
ry reform  of United  States asylum  policy.'  These  proposals  maintain  the
basic  structure  of  the  current  system  which  includes:  (1) an  informal
Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service  (INS)  adjudication  before  an
asylum  officer  for  applicants  who  are  not  in  deportation  or  exclusion
proceedings;  and  (2)  a  formal  Executive  Office  of Immigration  Review
(EOIR)  evidentiary  hearing  before  an  immigration judge2  A  major pro-
posed rule  change  is  that asylum  officers  will  only  grant  cases  and  will
refer  all  others  to  immigration judges  for  a  full  evidentiary  hearing.3  In
addition  to these  proposed  regulatory  reforms,  there  are  various  legisla-
tive proposals including  a bill,  introduced  by Congressman  Mazzoli,  that
would  eliminate immigration judges  altogether  and  provide asylum appli-
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sity;  J.D.  Northeastern  University  School  of  Law;  LL.M.  Harvard  Law  School.  The
Ford  Foundation provided  support  for  both  of the  Harvard  studies  cited  in  this  article.
As  always,  the  author  and  the  Immigration  and  Refugee  Program  owe  special  thanks
to  Professor  Gary  Bellow  of  the  Harvard  Law  School,  Faculty  Director  of Clinical
Programs,  for  his  leadership  and  inspiration.
1.  See  Sarah  Ignatius,  Restricting The Rights of Asylum  Seekers:  The New  Legis-
lative and Administrative Proposals, 7  HARV.  HUm.  RTS.  J.  225  (1994)  (providing  a
comprehensive  review  of these  and  other  asylum  reform  proposals).
2.  INS  No.  1651-93:  Rules  and  Procedures  for  Adjudication  of Applications  for
Asylum  and  Withholding  of  Deportation  and  for  Employment  Authorization,  59  Fed.
Reg.  61,  14,779  (1994)  (to  be  codified  at  8  C.F.R.  §  208);  INS  Drafts Asylum  Re-
form  Regulations,  71  INTERPRETER  RELEASES  185  (1994)  [hereinafter  INS  Asylum
Reform  Proposals]. The  Justice  Department  created  the  Executive  Office  of Immigra-
tion  Review  (EOIR)  in  1983  as  a  separate  agency  from  the  INS.  See  generally T.
ALEXANDER  ALEINIKOFF  AND  DAVID  E.  MARTIN,  IMMIGRATION;  PROCESS  AND  POLICY
638-43  (2d  ed.  1994)  (providing  a  detailed  description  of EOIR  procedures);  DEBORAH
E.  ANKER,  AMERICAN  IMMIGRATION  LAW  FOUNDATION,  LAW  OF  ASYLUM  IN  THE
UNITED  STATES,  22-60  (2d  ed.  1991)  (same).
3.  59  Fed.  Reg.  61,  14,779,  14,786-87  (1994)  (to  be  codified  at  8  C.F.R.  §
208.14(b))  (proposed  March  30,  1994).AM.  U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
cants  with  a single  interview  before  an  asylum  officer without  a right  to
an  evidentiary  hearing  or  a  decision  by  an  independent  adjudicator
There  also  are  several  legislative  proposals  for  summary  exclusion.'
These  provide  expedited  preliminary  screening  hearings  for  certain  asy-
lum  applicants  using  a legal standard  different  from the  asylum  standard,
informal  interviews  by  an  INS  officer,  review  by  another  officer  but
with  no  evidentiary  hearing  and  severe  limitations  on  most  forms  of
judicial  review.  Other  proposals  have  suggested  the  creation  of  a  new
type  of hearing  officer  and  a  change  in  the  standard  of proof  for  asy-
lum.6  The  strong  perc6ption  that  the  existing  asylum  system  is  too  gen-
erous,  and  that  fraudulent  claims  discredit  and  overwhelm  it,  motivates
these  reforms.  Recent  media  reports  fostered  this  perception  and  had  a
significant  impact on  mobilizing public  opinion  in favor  of reform  initia-
tives.7
A  study  that  our  immigration  and  refugee  program  at  Harvard  Law
School  completed  a  few  months  ago  presents  data  that  challenges  these
perceptions.  The  results  of this  study  are contained  in  a report  by  Sarah
Ignatius.8  The  two-year  report  was  the  first  comprehensive  non-govern-
mental  study of the  implementation  of the  1990  asylum  reforms.  Among
other  changes,  the  1990  reforms  replaced  INS  examiners  working  under
the  jurisdiction  of the  local  district  directors  with  full-time  trained  asy-
lum officers  who  are responsible  to the  Central  INS  Asylum  Office.  The
4.  H.R.  3363,  103d  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  (1993).
5.  S.  1333,  103d  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  (1993);  H.R.  2836,  103d  Cong.  1st  Sess.
(1993);  H.R.  3860,  103d  Cong.  2d  Sess.  (1994).  Congressman  Mazzoli's  bill  also con-
tains  summary  exclusion  provisions.  See  H.R.  3363,  103d  Cong.,  Ist  Sess.  (1993)
(pertaining  to  asylum  applicants  who  arrive  without  documents  or  with  fraudulent
documents).  INS  officers  would  screen  applicants  to  determine  if  they  had  a  "credible
fear  of  persecution"  before  permitting  them  to  apply  for  asylum  through  regular  chan-
nels.  Id.;  see also Ignatius,  supra note  1,  at  236-37  (discussing  the  uses  of the  credi-
ble  fear  standard  and  various  reports  criticizing  the  past  use  of  the  standard).
6.  H.R.  1679,  103d  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  (1993).
7.  See,  e.g.,  60  Minutes:  How  Did  He  Get  Here? (CBS  television  broadcast,
Mar.  14,  1993,  reprinted in  Asylum  and Inspections Reform:  Hearings on  H.R.  1153,
H.R.  1355, and H.R.  1679 Before  the Subcomm.  on  Immigration, Refugees  and Inter-
national Law  of the House  Comm.  on  the Judiciary, 103  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  51  (1993)).
8.  SARAH  IGNATIUS,  HARVARD  LAW  SCHOOL,  IMMIGRATION  AND  REFUGEE  PRO-
GRAM,  NATIONAL  ASYLUM  STUDY  PROJECT,  AN  ASSESSMENT  OF  THE  ASYLUM  PRO-
CESS  OF  THE  IMMIGRATION  AND  NATURALIZATION  SERVICE  (1993)  [hereinafter  NA-
TIONAL  ASYLUM  STUDY  PROJECT  FINAL  REPORT].  Copies  of  this  report  are  available
by  writing  to  Harvard  Law  School  Immigration  and  Refugee  Program,  Pound  Hall
511,  Cambridge  MA.  02138.IMMIGRATION REFORMS
Study  analyzed  1,331  cases  that  a total of  151  asylum  officers  adjudicat-
ed  in  all  seven  of the  asylum  regions;  these  cases  included  asylum  ap-
plicants  from  60  countries.9  The  Study  contained  analyses  of 880  notic-
es  of intent to  deny  or preliminary  assessments  to  grant  asylum,  includ-
ing  477  received  from  attorneys  and  403  that  the  INS  provided  for re-
view.'  The  Study  concluded  that  the  asylum  officer  corps  was  a  sig-
nificant  improvement  over  the  past  system  of  INS  adjudication,  with
substantial  management  and  related  problems  attributable,  in  large  part,
to a  failure to fund  and  otherwise  resource  the  program  at  an  appropri-
ate  level."  Overall,  the  assessment  and  recommendations  on  manage-
ment  and  administration  were  similar  to  those  of a  Department  of Jus-
tice report, released  contemporaneously.'2
I want  to discuss  some of the  Study's  findings  that  relate  to  the  pos-
sible  existence  of  an  asylum  crisis,  as  promoted  and  described  in  the
media.  First-and  this  is  based  on  publicly  available  statistics-asylum
applicants  arriving  in  the  United  States  primarily  come  from  refugee-
producing  countries.  The  Study  compiled  stiitistics  after  the  first  eleven
months  of  1993  and  out  of  approximately  133,000  asylum  applicants,
seventy  percent  came  from  ten  countries:  Bangladesh,  China,  El  Salva-
dor, Guatemala,  Haiti,  India,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Pakistan,  and  the  Phil-
ippines. 3  In  each  of these  countries  except  Mexico,  human  rights  orga-
nizations  documented  widespread  human  rights  abuses  that  produced
refugee  flows.  As  the report  notes,  in  Mexico  these  same  human  rights
organizations  have  documented  targeted  persecution."'
Second,  there  was a  relatively  low  no-show  rate-only  sixteen  per-
cent-for  applicants  at  INS  asylum  interviews.'  As  the  final  report
notes,  what  is  quite  remarkable  is  that  this  appearance  rate  of  eighty-
four  percent  existed  despite  computer  problems  that  in  many  cases  re-
sulted in "no  notice at all  of asylum  interviews,  notice only  to  the appli-
cant and  not  his or her attorney,  or  notice  only two  or three  days before
9.  Id.  at  vi.
10.  Id.
11.  NATIONAL  ASYLUM  STUDY  PROJECT  FINAL  REPORT  supra  note  8.  at  3.
12.  Management  and  Planning  Staff, Justice  Management  Division,  Management
Review  of  the  INS  Affirmative  Asylum  Processing  System  (Dept.  of  Justice,  Sept.
1993)  (on  file  with  The  American  University Journal of International Lass, and Poli-
cy); see 70  INTERPRETER  RELEASES,  Oct.  18,  1993,  at  1364  (providing  a  report  on  the
two  studies).
13.  NATIONAL  ASYLUM  STUDY  PROJECT  FINAL  REPORT.  supra note  8.  at  3.
14.  Id.
15.  See  id. at  4-5  (referring  to  the  first  eleven  months  of FY  1993).
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the  interview."' 6  For  example,  the  Newark  asylum  office,  "the  office
with  the highest  no-show  rate  was  also  the  office  with  the  allegations  of
the most  computer  errors  in  the  INS  database." 7
Third,  much  of the present  crisis  is  the result  of inefficiency,  misman-
agement,  unfairness,  and  discrimination  attributable  to the  INS.  Thus,  of
the  over  318,000  cases  in  the  backlog  at  the  end  of  the  study  period,
the  previous  system  left  114,000  cases  undecided. 8  Another  50,000
were  Salvadoran  and  Guatemalan  claims  that  the  Bush  administration,
under  a  settlement  agreement  in  American  Baptist  Churches  v.
Thornburgh,9  agreed  had  to  be  re-adjudicated  because  of discrimination
against  those  groups  under  the  pre-1990  INS  district  director  asylum
system.2 0
Fourth,  as  noted  above,  the  overall  assessment  of the  asylum  officer
corps  was  of a  "substantially  more  professional,  informed,  and  impartial
body  of  asylum  decision-makers"  than  the  pre-1990  INS  examiners."
Asylum  officers  generally  were  successful  at  eliciting  the  applicant's
claim  and  at  conducting  the  interviews  in  a  non-adversarial  manner.22
The  Study  identified  serious  legal  errors  and  substantial  unevenness  in
the  quality  of  decision  making.'  Despite  these  and  other  problems,
however,  the  Study  found  that  the  asylum  officer  corps  was  moving  in
the  direction  of  improved  adjudication.  Most  of  our  recommendations
related  to  better  management,  improved  resources,  training,  and  hiring
criteria.  Although  there  are  several  important  matters  with  which  we
disagree,'  many  of  our  recommendations  are  consistent  with  the  regu-
16.  Id.
17.  Id. at  5.
18.  Id.
19.  760  F.  Supp.  796  (N.D.  Cal.  1991);  see  Carolyn  Patty  Blum,  The  Settlement
of American Baptist Churches v.  Thornburgh: Landmark  Victory for Central American
Asylum-Seekers,  3  INT'L  J.  REFUGEE  L.  347  (1991).
20.  NATIONAL  ASYLUM  STUDY  PROJECT  FINAL  REPORT,  supra note  8,  at  4.
21.  Id. at  1.
22.  See  id.  (stating  that  "[ijn  almost  70%  of  the  asylum  interviews  studied,  asy-
lum  officers  elicited  the  claim  of  the  applicant  at  the  interview  and  conducted  the
interview  in  a  non-adversarial  manner").
23.  Id. at  1,  93-94.
24.  For  example,  we  disagree  with  the  proposed  elimination  of  Notices  of  Intent
to  Deny  (NOIDS).  We  found  that  rebuttals  to  NOIDs  serve  an  important  corrective
role,  particularly  given  the  significant  incidence  of  fundamental  legal  errors  in  asylum
officer  decision  making.  Id.  at  117.  In  addition,  the  Study  recommended  interviews
and  adjudication  of  applications  for  work  authorization  within  90  days  of  filing.  The
Administration's  proposals  do  not  require  the  granting  of  work  authorization  before1994] IMMIGRATION REFORMS
latory  reforms  proposed  by  the  Clinton  administration  which  maintain
the present  structure  of  asylum  officer  and  immigration  judge  adjudica-
tion  with  additional  resources  for  improved  management  and  quality  of
decision  making.  The  Study  strongly  recommended  the  implementation
of  these  changes  rather  than  "a  drastic  overhaul  of  the  process  or  the
design  of another  new administrative  structure,  which  would  create  addi-
tional  expense  and  delay  in  case  adjudication."'
Fifth,  many  of the problems  the  Study  identified  are  systemic  and  are
inherent  to  the  nature  of the asylum  officer  corps  program.  The  asylum
officer  interview  is  an  informal  adjudication.  Applicants  are  not  afforded
basic  due  process  protection  guaranteed  in  immigration  court.  This  in-
cludes  the right  to present  and  cross-examine  witnesses  and  the  right  to
a  court-appointed  interpreter.'  There  is  no  meaningful  role  allowed  for
the  asylum  applicant's  counsel  and  no  record  of the  proceedings.  There-
fore,  there  is  no possibility  for accountability  in  the  form of administra-
tive  or judicial review."  We  do  not believe  this  type  of process  can  be
180  days  after  filing.  INS  Asylum  Reform  Proposals, supra  note  2.  See  generally
JEANNE  BUTTERFIELD,  ET.  AL,  AMERICAN  IMMIGRATION  LAvYERs  ASSOCIATION,  COM-
NmmS,  INS  No.  1651-93:  RuLEs  AND  PROCEDURES  FOR  ADJUDICATION  OF  APPLICA-
TIONS  FOR  ASYLUM  OR  WITHHOLDING  OF  DEPORTATION  AND  FOR  EMPLOYMENT  AU-
THORIZATION  (1994)  (on  file  with  The  American  University Journal of International
Law  and Policy) (providing  a  comprehensive  comment  on  the  proposed  rules).
25.  NATIONAL  ASYLUM  STUDY  PROJECT  FINAL  REPORT,  supra note  8,  at  2. The
present  asylum  system  was  never  financed  or  staffed  correctly.  The  asylum  office  ini-
tially asked  for  a  corps  of 265  officers  and  received  funding  for  only  82  positions;  a
year  later  the  number  of  officers  increased  by  68  officers  to  reach  a  total  of  150.
The  administration  proposes  to  seek  funding  for  150  more  officers,  so  that  after  three
years  the  program  will  have  approximately  the  number  of  officers  it  needed  at  its
inception.  ld.  at  41.  With  both  the  backlog  and  current  receipts  increasing,  this  num-
ber  will  be  barely  adequate  when,  and  if, the  positions  are  funded  and  allocated.  See
Roberto  Sum,  An  Abundance  of Asylum  Seekers:  Overhaul Could  Leave  I  Million
Immigrants Stuck  in  Backlog,  VASH.  POST,  Mar.  14,  1994,  at  Al.  As  the  National
Asylum  Study  Project  report  points  out  "[clompared  with  other  countries,  the  United
States  has  fewer  asylum  adjudicators  and  staff  proportionately  for  its  case  load."  NA-
TIONAL  ASYLUM  STUDY  PROJECT  FINAL  REPORT,  supra note  8,  at  60.
26.  See  Deborah  Anker, Determining Asylum  Claims in the  United States: A  Case
Study  on  the  Implementation of Legal  Norms  in  an  Unstructured Adjudicatoy Envi-
ronment,  19  N.Y.U.  REv.  L.  &  SOC.  CHANGE  433,  442  (1992)  (discussing  proceed-
ings  before  immigration  judges).
27.  See,  In  re  -, (BIA  March  7,  1991)  (unpublished  decision),  in  DEBORAH
ANKER,  AmERICAN  IMMIGRATION  LAW  FOUNDATION,  3  LAw  OF  ASYLUM  IN  THE
UNrrED  STATES:  ADMINISTRATIVE  DECISIONS  AND  ANALYSIS  102  (3d  ed.  1994)  (not-
ing  the  difficulty  the  Board  of  Immigration  Appeals  has  confronted  in  reviewing  asy-
lum  officer  decisions  is  due,  in  part,  to  the  lack  of  an  adequate  record).  CompareAM.  U  J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the  sole  means  of determining  asylum  claims.  The  Study,  therefore,  rec-
ommended  maintaining  the  right  to  a  hearing  before  an  immigration
judge  allowed  under  the current  system.
We  believe  that  accountability  must  continue  to  be  built  into  asylum
adjudication.  The  asylum  and  immigration  administrative  systems  have
suffered,  both  from  the  perspectives  of fairness  and  efficiency,  from  a
lack  of accountability.  For those  who  care  about  improving  the  adminis-
tration  of  our  immigration  laws,  it  is  critical  that  immigration  officials
be  given  less,  not  more,  unreviewable  power  and  discretion.  Moreover,
the  asylum  system  must  not  only  be  expeditious,  but  also  must  be  per-
ceived  as  credible.  Studies  of the  current  and  prior systems  reveal  deci-
sion-making  processes  that  have  not  always  produced  consistent  and
substantively  fair  outcomes.  As  noted,  the  Study  found  problems  in  the
quality  and  independence  of decision  making  among  the  current  asylum
officer  corps. 8  A  1987  Government  Accounting  Office  study,  that  in-
JERRY  L.  MASHAW,  BuREAucRATIC  JUSTICE  (1983)  (arguing  that  judicial  review  may
not  always  be  the  most  effective  way  to  insure  fairness  and  efficiency  in  administra-
tive  agencies  and  that  internal  accountability  through  supervisory  review  and  other
mechanisms  may  sometimes  be  more  effective)  with  NATIONAL  ASYLUM  STUDY  PRO-
JECT  FINAL  REPORT,  supra note  8,  at  116  (noting  an  insufficient  number  of supervi-
sors,  the  lack  of appropriate  hiring  criteria  for  supervisors,  insufficient  time  spent  con-
ducting  review  of  asylum  decisions,  and  the  small  percentage  of  cases  reviewed  by
the  quality  assurance  branch  of  the  central  office).  Our  study  was  not  reassuring  about
internal  mechanisms  as  a  substitute  for judicial  review  and  other  non-agency  oversight,
such  as  applicants'  attorneys'  responses  to  notices  of  intent  to  deny.  Supra  note  24.
See  generally Stephen  H.  Legomsky,  Political Asylum  and  the  Theory  of  Judicial
Review,  73  MINN.  L.  REV.  1205,  1215  (1989)  (discussing  the  role  of judicial  review
in  asylum  adjudication).
28.  Asylum  officers  are  instructed  to  reach  decisions  on  individual  cases  indepen-
dent  from  foreign  policy  considerations.  ASYLUM  BRANCH  &  OFFICE  OF  THE  GENERAL
COUNSEL,  IMMIGRATION  AND  NATURALIZATION  SERVICE  BASIC  LAW  MANUAL:  ASY-
LUM,  A  TRAINING  MANUAL  FOR  IMMIGRATION  AND  NATURALIZATION  OFFICERS,  REFU-
GEE  LAW  AND  PRACTICE,  A  REFERENCE  OF  PERSPECTIVES  AND  PARAMETERS  ON  SE-
LECTED  LEGAL  ISSUES  8  (1991).  Further,  INS  regulations  acknowledge  the  usefulness
of  non-governmental  sources  in  evaluating  conditions  in  the  country  of  origin.  8
C.F.R.  §  208.12(a)  (1994).  INS  developed  these  guidelines  in  response  to  criticism
from  many  quarters  that  asylum  adjudicators  were  inappropriately  influenced  by  for-
eign  policy  and  ideological  considerations.  Anker,  supra note  26,  at  n.71-74.  Nonethe-
less,  the  Study  found  that  asylum  officers  continued  to  rely  on  State  Department
materials  in  assessing  a  well-founded  fear  of  persecution  in  80%  of  the  cases  studied
and  used  credible  non-governmental  sources  only  on  a  limited  basis.  NATIONAL  ASY-
LUM  STUDY  PROJECT  FINAL  REPORT  supra note  8,  at  8,  123-39.  In  both  these  re-
spects,  however,  asylum  officers'  decisions  demonstrated  an  improvement  over  time.IMMIGRATION REFORMS
cluded  cases  decided  by  the  INS  under  the  pre-1990  system  as  well  as
those  decided  by  immigration  judges,  found  that  adjudicators  evaluated
the  claims  alleging the most  serious  forms  of persecution  differently  and
that the outcomes  varied  according  to the  applicant's  nationality."
Another  case  study  of  an  immigration  court  conducted  by  our  pro-
gram  at  Harvard  found  that  the  court  granted  only  ten  percent  of  the
apparently  strongest  cases'  and  that  the  immigration  court  system  was
seriously  compromised  by  a  lack  of  formal  procedures,  ad-hoc  deter-
minations,  lack of independence  of judgment,  over-reliance  on  the  State
Department,  lack  of  criteria  for  establishing  precedents  at  the Board  of
Immigration  Appeals,  and  other  significant  inefficiencies.3  The  immi-
gration  court  study  found  that  these  inefficiencies  were  largely  the  re-
sponsibility  of INS  trial  attorneys  refusing  to  concede  meritorious  cases
and  of  immigration  judges  making  inappropriate  scheduling  decisions,
routinely  allowing  only  an  hour  or two  for a  hearing  which  led  to  con-
tinuances  for  a complete  hearing  on a  claim.3 2  The  EOIR's  difficulty  in
producing transcripts  for appeals  was  the most  significant  cause  of delay
in the  process.  The  unavailability  of these  transcripts  resulted  in  delays
averaging  twenty-two  months  after  the  immigration  judge  rendered  a
decision. 3  In  addition,  the  Board  of  Immigration  Appeals  required,  in
most  cases,  two  to  three  years,  and  sometimes  longer, to  issue decisions
after  attorneys  for  the  applicants  submitted  briefs.'  Clearly,  if we  are
to continue  hearings  by immigration judges, that  system itself needs  sub-
stantial  improvement  such  as  training  for judges  and  rules  that  require
the Board  of Immigration Appeals  to  make its  decision-making processes
open  and  principled.
29.  See  GOVERNMENT  ACCOUNTiNG  OFFCE.,  ASYLUM:  UNIFORM  APPLiCATIO,  OF
STANDARDs  UNCERTAIN-FEw  DENIED  APPLICANTS  DEPORTED  22,  23  (1987)  (stating
that  "Applicants  from  different  countries  who  claimed  to  have  suffered  similar  mis-
treatment  did  not  have  similar  approval  rates.  Worldwide  . . . [of]  . . . applicants
who  claimed  they  were  arrested,  imprisoned,  had  their  life  threatened,  or  were  tor-
tured,  we  found  an  approval  rate  of  19%.  Of  these  aliens,  applicants  from  El  Salva-
dor  and  Nicaragua  had  a  much  lower  approval  rate  than  applicants  from  Poland  and
Iran").  The  report  also  noted  agreement  between  the  INS  decision  and  the  Department
of State  advisory  opinion  in  96%  of  the  cases.  Id.
30.  Anker,  supra note  26,  at  452-454.
31.  Id.  at  455-457,  The  Board  of  Immigration  Appeals  is  the  administrative
appellate  body  within  the  EOIR  that  has  jurisdiction  over  appeals  from  immigration
judge  decisions  in  deportation  and  exclusion  proceedings.  Supra note  2.
32.  Id  at 456.
33.  Id  at 457.
34.  Id
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It is  particularly  significant  that  both the  Harvard  asylum  officer corps
and  immigration  court  studies  found  that  many,  indeed  most,  delays  are
attributable  not  to  the  applicant  but  to  the  agency,  either  because  of
poor,  unmonitored  judgments  or  insufficient  resources.35  If  we  embark
on  a  course-one  which  I  fear  is  implicit  in  many  of  the  legislative
proposals  as  well  as  in  some  aspects  of  the  administration's  regulatory
proposals 36 -- of  giving  INS  more  unreviewable  power  and  discretion,
we  will  exacerbate  these  management  problems  as  well  as  create  an
alarming  precedent  for  arbitrary  governmental  conduct.  The  positive
changes  in  the  asylum  system  over  the  last  fifteen  years-beginning
with  the  advocacy  for  the  Refugee  Act  of  1980-are  the  result  of  out-
side  voices  and  scrutiny  by  the  public,  the  non-governmental  and  aca-
demic  communities,  as  well  as  by  the  federal  judiciary.37  Many  of  the
best  features  of  the  current  INS  process-indeed,  the  very  endeavor  to
create  a  quasi-independent  and  professional  asylum  officer  corps-are
the  results  of this  independent  examination  and  advocacy. 38  The  estab-
lishment  of the  Resource  Information  Center, 39  the  provision  in  the  reg-
35.  See  id. at  456  (noting  that  less  than  one  percent  of  the  continuances  granted
were  attributable  to  the  applicants  failure  to  appear);  see  also  NATIONAL  ASYLUM
STUDY  PROJECT  FINAL  REPORT,  supra note  8,  at  4-5,  45-48  (finding  a  relatively  low
overall  non-appearance  rate  of  16%  and  an  unusually  high  non-appearance  rate  of
33%  at  the  Newark  asylum  office,  where  there  were  the  most  computer  errors  in
entering  applicant  names  into  the  database  so  that  they  could  receive  timely  notice).
36.  See  supra note  24  (discussing  the  elimination  of  notices  of  intent  to  deny
(NOIDS)).
37.  See  generally  The  Refugee  Act  of  1980:  Its  Past and Future,  1982  MicH.
Y.B.  INT'L  LEGAL  STUDIES  91;  Deborah  E.  Anker  and  Michael  H.  Posner,  The  Forty
Year  Crisis: A  Legislative  History of  the  Refugee  Act  of  1980,  19  SAN  DIEGO  L.
REv.  9  (1981)  (discussing  the  history  of  the  Refugee  Act  of  1980).
38.  INS  proposed  regulations  in  1987  that  would  have  created  asylum  officers  not
as  a  separate  corps,  but  as  part  of the  normal  INS  district  director  structure.  These
regulations  would  have  eliminated  immigration  judges  from  any  role  in  asylum  adjudi-
cation.  The  regulations  were  defeated  by  a  coalition  of  advocacy  organizations  which
protested  that  immigration  judge  hearings  were  necessary  to  ensure  protection  of basic
due  process  rights.  See  Asylum  Plan is  Under Attack,  N.Y.  TIMES  October  27,  1987
at  A18;  Zita  Arocha,  Political Asylum  Revision  Dropped; Immigration Judges to  Re-
tain Appeals  Role at the  INS,  WASH.  POST,  October  27,  1987  at  A23  (discussing  the
Reagan  Administration's  proposal  to  have  the  Justice  Department  rule  on  asylum
applications  and  the  Administration's  subsequent  back-down  from  the  proposal  in  the
face  of  opposition  from  attorneys  and  immigrant  advocacy  groups).  Many  of  these
same  groups  worked  closely  with  the  Justice  Department  in  establishing  a  consensus
for  the  1990  reforms,  which  retained  the  immigration  judges  and  established  a  pro-
fessional  and  quasi-independent  corps  of asylum  officers.
39.  See  David  A  Martin,  Reforming  Asylum  Adjudication:  On  Navigating  theIMMIGRATION REFORMS
ulations  permitting  proof  based  on  the  treatment  of  similarly  situated
persons,'  and  the instructions  on evaluating  credibility  in  light  of infor-
mation  on  human  rights  conditions  in  the  country  of  origin'  are  at-
tributable  to  advocacy  efforts  or judicial  review.  We  have  a  choice  to
respond  to a  mischaracterized  crisis  and  turn  back  the  clock,  or to  con-
tinue  the process  begun  over  the  last  fifteen  years  of  the  "transforma-
tion"  of immigration  law,  that  is, making  the practice  of immigration
agencies  consonant  with  salient norms  of administrative  law  and  consti-
tutional  due  process,'2  and  making  agency  adjudicatory  and  decision-
Coast of Bohemia,  138  U.  PA.  L.  REv.  1247,  1342-44  (1990)  (recommending  the  es-
tablishment  of a  documentation  resource  center  independent  of the  State  Department).
Professor  Martin's  article  is  based  on  his  report  to  the  Administrative  Conference  of
the  United  States that  issued  recommendations  including  the  creation  of such  a  center.
54  Fed.  Reg.  28,964,  28,970-72  (1989)  (codified  at  I  C.F.R  § 305.89A  (1990)).  See
also  Anker,  supra note  26,  at  462  (recommending  the  establishment  of a  non-govern-
mental  documentation  center).
40.  8  C.F.R.  §208.13(b)(2)(i)  (1994).  Before  the  reforms,  numerous  courts  had
suggested  that  evidence  of persecution  of those  similarly  situated  constituted  proof  of
the  seriousness  of  the  risk  to  the  applicant.  See  Bolanos-Hernandez v.  INS.  767  F.2d
1277,  1280  (9th  Cir.  1984)  (citing  evidence  of persecution  of applicant's  friends,  who,
like  he,  had  refused  to  join  guerrillas,  and  newspaper  articles  showing  violent  conse-
quences  for  those  who  refuse  to  join  political  guerrilla  groups);  Mendoza-Perez  v.
INS,  902  F.2d  760,  762  (9th Cir.  1990)  (finding  proof  of danger  to  applicant  where
testimony  showed  others  who  worked  for  his  organization  were  killed).  In  contrast
were  "years  of  BIA  decisions  emphasizing  'singling  out'  and  'individual  targeting'"
until  the  promulgation  of the  regulation.  Kotasz  v.  INS,  31  F.3d  847  (9th  Cir.  1994),
1994  U.S.  App.  LEXIS  19671.  Actually,  the  Board  of Immigration  Appeals  had  begun
to  recognize  this  principle  in  1987  after  the  Supreme  Court  in  INS  v.  Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480  U.S.  421,  450  (1987)  overruled  the  agency  for  imposing  an  improperly
demanding  standard  of  proof  on  asylum  applicants.  See  Matter of  Mogharrabhi,  19
I&N  Dec.  734  (BIA  1988).
41.  8  C.F.R.  §  208.13.  This  regulation  is  based  on  principles  first  articulated  by
the  Ninth  Circuit.  See  Bolanos-Hernandez v.  INS,  767  F.2d  at  1284-1285  (9th  Cir.
1984)  (overruling  the  BIA  and  noting  the  relevance  of  the  applicant's  "general  evi-
dence,  newspaper  articles  that  demonstrate  the  political  and  social  turmoil  in  El  Salva-
dor....").  See  generally Carolyn  Patty  Blum,  The  Ninth  Circuit and the  Protection
of Asylum  Seekers  Since the Passage of the Refugee  Act of  1980,  23  SAN  DIEGO  L
REv.  327  (1986)  (providing  a  comprehensive  discussion  of  the  role  of  the  Federal
Court of Appeals  for  the  Ninth  Circuit  in  reviewing  Board  asylum  decisions);  Deborah
Anker  and  Carolyn  Blum,  New  Trends  in Asylum  Jurisprudence: The Aftermath  of the
U.S. Supreme  Court Decision in  INS  v.  Cardoza-Fonseca, I  INT'L  J.  REFUGEE  L  252
(1990)  (same).
42.  See  Peter  H.  Schuck,  The Transformation of Immigration Lam,  84 COLm.  L
REV.  1  (1984)  (describing  the  role  of  the  federal  judiciary  and  other  forces  in  trans-
forming  immigration  law  from  its  past  where  it  was  "radically  insulated"  from  fun-
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making  processes  accessible,  principled  and  accountable.
damental  norms  of constitutional  right,  administrative  procedure,  and  judicial  role  to  a
new  structure  more  consonant  with  these  principles).